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INTRODUCTION
On January 15, 2020, the United States and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC or China) signed Phase I of the U.S.-China Economic and Trade
Agreement (USCTA), which suspended a two-year trade war between the
world’s two largest economies.1 Proclaimed by the United States as a
breakthrough, the USCTA contains commitments by China to purchase $200
billion in U.S. goods and services and to implement substantial new protections
for U.S. intellectual property (IP) rights.2 Aside from China’s purchase
commitments, the most touted parts of the USCTA are China’s new
comprehensive commitments on intellectual property and its new dispute
resolution mechanism.3 The first two chapters of the USCTA deal exclusively
with IP rights, with a focus on trade secrets and technology transfer.4 These
provisions show a primary focus on criminal enforcement and also promote

*
1

2
3
4

BA, JD, Yale University. Bazler Chair in Business Law, The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz
College of Law. Thanks to Thomas J. Schoenbaum for his helpful comment and to Natasha Landon,
Moritz Reference Librarian, and Amy Pratt, Moritz 2L, for their assistance with this article.
Ana Swenson & Alan Rappeport, Trump Signs China Trade Deal, Putting Economic Conflict on
Pause, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/economy/chinatrade-deal.html. The formal name of the agreement is the Economic and Trade Agreement Between
the Government of the United States and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, Jan. 15,
2020, [hereinafter USCTA].
See USCTA, supra note 1, chs. 1–2 (“Intellectual Property” and “Technology Transfer”); see also id,
ch. 1, § B (“The United States emphasizes trade secrets protection.”).
Id., ch. 1.
Id., chs. 1 & 2.
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enforcement through civil litigation and administration action.5 Under the
Trump Administration, the United States has vowed to make enforcement of its
IP rights a top priority.6
As a matter of procedural law, the USCTA has created the ultimate
enforcement weapon of IP rights for the United States.7 For more than two
decades, previous U.S. administrations had relied on informal arrangements
such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and high-level dialogues to
address U.S. concerns about protection for IP rights.8 The major flaw in this
approach was that these arrangements lacked a formal dispute resolution
mechanism and provided no means to enforce China’s promises.9 When China
broke its promises to protect IP, the U.S. response was to enter into another
MOU and only see this frustrating slow dance with China repeat itself.10 Under
the Trump Administration, the United States has adopted a more bellicose
attitude towards China that is embodied in the USCTA.
In contrast with the informality of prior arrangements, the USCTA has the
formality and structure of a treaty and contains a new and path-breaking dispute
resolution mechanism.11 Under all prior U.S. trade agreements, the parties
submitted disputes to a neutral and independent arbitration tribunal or to the
World Trade Organization (WTO).12 Under the USCTA, no third-party tribunal
has been established, and no recourse to the WTO is possible.13 The parties are
to resolve disputes face-to-face. As Robert Lighthizer, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), has declared, “The only arbitrator I trust is myself.”14
5
6
7

8
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13

14

See generally id.; see infra Part II.A.1.d.ii.
U.S INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ANNUAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT TO
CONGRESS 11 (2019).
This does not mean, however, that the procedural weapon created by the USCTA is lawful under
international law. To the contrary, the USCTA dispute resolution mechanism is in violation of several
key tenets of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and its Dispute
Settlement Understanding. See Daniel C.K. Chow, A New and Controversial Approach to Dispute
Resolution Under the U.S.-China Trade Agreement of 2020, 26 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 31, 53-55
(2020). It would, however, be futile for China to file a complaint in the WTO because the United
States has already disabled the WTO dispute settlement system. See id at 48. China’s obligation to
purchase $200 billion in goods and services is also in violation of the WTO. See id at 33.
See infra Part I.A.
There are no provisions for dispute resolution in the 1992 U.S.-China MOU on intellectual property.
See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and
the Government of the United States of America on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992),
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005362.asp [hereinafter 1992
MOU].
OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. FACT SHEET FOR THE 27TH U.S.-CHINA JOINT
COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE – FACT SHEET (2016); David J. Lynch, Trump Signs Partial
Economic Deal with China, Calls Trade Pact a ‘Momentous Step,’ THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 15,
2020,
9:00PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trumps-new-china-dealcements-emergence-of-managed-trade/2020/01/15/7892c446-372b-11ea-bf30ad313e4ec754_story.html.
What is referred to as a treaty under international law can be either a treaty or an executive agreement
under U.S. law. As a technical matter, the USCTA is an executive agreement that the President or its
delegate, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), can enter into without the need for
subsequent congressional approval. The dispute resolution provisions of the USCTA are contained
in Chapter 7 of the USCTA, supra note 1 (“Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution”).
Chow, supra note 7, at 35, 45.
Id. When the United States enters into a trade agreement, the agreement may contain treaty
obligations as well as provisions incorporating obligations under the WTO agreements. When a
dispute involves WTO obligations, the parties may choose to resolve them either under the treaty
dispute resolution mechanism or the WTO dispute settlement system. Id. at 42.
Id. at 53.
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Under the USCTA, the United States has a unilateral right to declare China
in breach of its treaty and WTO obligations.15 Moreover, under the USCTA, the
United States also has the unilateral right to impose trade sanctions on China.16
The USCTA forbids China from retaliating against the United States and only
allows China the option of withdrawing from the treaty.17 If China withdraws
from the USCTA, however, the United States could reinstate the punitive tariffs
that created the trade war that the USCTA suspended.18 Once the United States
finds China in breach, China will have to suffer tariffs no matter what it decides.
The United States will be able to impose tariffs on China either by invoking the
USCTA dispute resolution mechanism or by reinstating the tariffs that the
USCTA suspended.
If China finds itself trapped and seeks to raise a complaint in the WTO
against the United States, China will find that such a recourse will be futile.19
Before entering into the USCTA, the United States had already paralyzed the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, hurling the WTO into a life-or-death
crisis.20 The WTO was made to suffer this grievous blow because it committed
the malfeasance of repeatedly ruling in WTO dispute settlement cases against
the United States.21 China’s only recourse is to go through the USCTA dispute
resolution mechanism, which is under complete U.S. control, or to withdraw and
suffer the consequences. The United States has boxed China into a no-win
situation and has closed off all exits.22
While the USCTA creates a path-breaking procedure for dispute resolution
that has created a formidable weapon for the United States, the same cannot be
said about the substantive provisions of the USCTA. For the USCTA to become
truly effective, the United States must also have substantive provisions that
address the major concerns of MNCs in IP enforcement through China’s legal
system that were not successfully addressed by prior U.S. approaches.
Otherwise, MNCs will continue to be frustrated in their day-to-day operations
by IP violations and by hurdles to effective on-the-ground enforcement when
using judicial and administrative authorities in China. While the USCTA is the
ultimate enforcement weapon, using the USCTA means elevating a dispute to
the bilateral level due to some breakdown in enforcement of PRC laws on the
ground level. Elevating the dispute could result in trade sanctions imposed by
the United States and the attendant increased tensions between the two nations.
If the enforcement of China’s IP laws on the ground functioned smoothly and
effectively, there would be no dispute that would need to be resolved on the
bilateral level or otherwise. Ensuring the effective enforcement of China’s IP
laws on the ground is thus a critical element to the overall success of the USCTA.

15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22

Id. at 36, 59.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 36.
See Trump: U.S. to Suspend Scheduled Tariffs After Reaching Deal with China, REUTERS (Dec. 13,
2019, 10:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-trump/trump-us-to-suspendscheduled-tariffs-after-reaching-deal-with-china-idUSKBN1YH1T3; Thomas Franck, Trump Halts
New China Tariffs and Rolls Back Some of the Prior Duties on $120 Billion of Imports, CNBC (Dec.
13, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/13/trump-says-25percent-tariffs-will-remainbut-new-china-duties-will-not-take-effect-sunday.html.
Chow, supra note 7 at 36.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 34-35.
The U.S. strategy is clever and effective, but that does not mean that it is lawful. See id. at 53–60.
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At present, the USCTA contains an omission of one of the most important
barriers to effective IP enforcement on the ground in China. MNCs have been
plagued for years by systemic corruption by both government and business
entities that create barriers to effective enforcement of their IP rights.23 Problems
of corruption occur in different variations in both criminal and civil enforcement
and when dealing with government or business entities. Problems of corruption
are especially serious in three illustrative areas that are the focus of this article.
First, in the case of the criminal enforcement of trade secrets—one of the
primary areas of focus in the USCTA—issues of corruption by government
entities are especially serious, as they arise at the threshold level in the criminal
enforcement procedure.24 In addition, while all corruption issues create
headaches, corruption issues involving enforcement of trade secrets is a “bet the
company” type of problem because it implicates liability under the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which prohibits bribes paid to foreign officials.25
In response to demands for payments from PRC enforcement authorities for the
performance of their services, MNCs routinely make these payments either
directly or through private investigation agencies under the employ of MNCs.26
While these payments may be tolerated by the PRC government, the U.S.
Department of Justice (USDOJ) is an aggressive enforcer of the FCPA and could
consider these payments to be illegal bribes.27 The USDOJ has its own mandate
that is independent of the mandate espoused by the United States Trade
Representative who championed the USCTA. An FCPA investigation is a major
disruption of a company’s business, and the prospect of the draconian sanctions
under the FCPA, which include imprisonment of company officers, is enough to
create major waves of fear and anxiety in corporate boardrooms in the United
States and other countries.28 It is ironic that the major protagonist for MNCs in
enforcing their trade secrets might not be the PRC government but the U.S.
government.
Second, aside from the issue of illegal payments, China’s judicial system is
notorious for the corrupt use by parties of ex parte contacts with judges in order
to influence the result of legal proceedings.29 These types of ex parte contacts
are commonly used and can be highly effective in influencing the result of an IP
case.30 In most instances, the party will not approach the frontline judge directly,
but will instead approach a higher level government official or a higher level
judge that sits on the appellate court overseeing the trial.31 The party will ask the
23 CKGSB Contributor, China Becomes Tougher for MNCs, But All Is Not Lost, FORBES (Sept. 10,
2014, 10:00AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ckgsb/2014/09/10/china-becomes-tougher-formncs-but-all-is-not-lost/#3b6a04353648
24 See infra Part II.A.
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2018) (anti-bribery provision).
26 This practice is based on the personal experience of the author, who worked as an in-house lawyer
for a large multinational company with substantial IP assets in China. The author has also discussed
this practice with IP lawyers currently working in China.
27 See Joe Palazzolo, From Watergate to Today, How FCPA Became So Feared, THE WALL ST. J. (Oct.
2,
2012,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444752504578024791676151154.
28 See id.
29 Jerome A. Cohen, A Looming Crisis for China’s Legal System, FOREIGN POLICY (Feb. 22, 2016,
10:15 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/a-looming-crisis-for-chinas-legal-system/.
30 Id.
31 Xin He & Kwai Hang Ng, “It Must Be Rock Strong!” Guanxi’s Impact on Judicial Decision Making
in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 841, 855 (2017).
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higher level official or judge to exert influence on the lower level judge.32
Skillful influence peddlers never use money, but rely on professional or personal
contacts (or “guanxi”) with the higher level judge or official.33 Under current
PRC law, such influence peddling falls into a gray area of the law; current PRC
Criminal Law defines bribery as requiring the exchange of “money” or
“property” and excludes the use of intangible benefits.34 The use of guanxi has
a venerable history in China, long predating the PRC, which may be one
explanation for why it is so prevalent.35 Many observers find that the use of
guanxi is the most serious problem of corruption in the PRC civil court system.36
There is a high probability that a defendant in an IP litigation brought by an
MNC will attempt to influence the outcome of the case through ex parte contacts
with the judge.37
Third, in the case of the growing problem of counterfeit and infringing
goods sold through the Internet, online counterfeiters frequently give business
bribes to employees at PRC e-commerce platforms.38 In exchange, the ecommerce platforms give the operators, i.e., online merchants, favorable
treatment such as the ability to delete negative consumer comments.39
Employees at e-commerce platforms will also tip off internet counterfeiters that
a complaint has been filed or that the counterfeiters are being investigated by
Chinese authorities.40 One area where these illicit arrangements are most
pernicious is registration. In exchange for business bribes, e-commerce
platforms are notoriously lax in conducting entity registration and verification
of new online operators.41 Instead, counterfeiters are allowed to use false names
and addresses and can disappear into the “vast expanse of cyberspace” at the
first sign of trouble—only to reappear in short order under a new name and
address.42 This is particularly harmful because China has a sophisticated system
of entity verification that if used properly can accurately identify, locate, and
deter counterfeiters.43 The rigorous enforcement of these registration and
verification requirements should have an immediate salutary effect in deterring
counterfeiters who harbor a great fear of capture and arrest.
Although these problems have proven to be intractable in the past, and
although the current version of Phase I of the USCTA does not address these
issues, there is still an opportunity to address them. The USCTA presents an
unprecedented opportunity to address these endemic issues because the United

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Id.
Id. at 841, 855, 864–65.
See infra text accompanying note 167.
See, e.g., SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE, AND THE CHANGING NATURE
OF GUANXI 3–20 (Thomas Gold et al. eds., 2002); John H. Dunning & Changsu Kim, The Cultural
Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory Study, 30 WORLD ECON. 329, 329–30 (2007).
See Cohen, supra note 29.
A recent study shows that litigants attempt to use ex parte contacts to influence the result of judicial
cases in over half of all cases. See He & Ng, supra note 31, at 842.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Alibaba, Amazon, and Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, 40 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 157, 181–82 (2020) [hereinafter Chow, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet].
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 192–93.
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States can directly affect China’s domestic legislation through the USCTA.44
Under the treaty, China has an obligation to implement legislation affecting the
treaty provision or otherwise be subject to sanctions.45
While Phase I of the USCTA has now been completed, the United States
and China are in the process of negotiating Phase II to address some of the
remaining and most contentious issues that were left out of the earlier
negotiations.46 The United States could include new provisions to address these
corruption issues as an amendment or revision to the Phase I agreement or by
new provisions in the Phase II agreement.
This article will proceed as follows. Part I examines the role of the USCTA
in promoting IP protection in China. Learning from China’s past failure to
follow through on its IP commitments, the USCTA allows the United States to
unilaterally declare China to be in breach of its USCTA and WTO obligations.
The United States can also unilaterally impose sanctions on China, whose only
recourse is to withdraw from the USCTA. As a matter of procedural law, the
USCTA provides every possible advantage to the United States. Part II will then
examine major problems of government and business corruption in the IP
enforcement process in three areas: demands for payments by PRC enforcement
authorities, the use of ex parte contacts to influence the results of civil litigation,
and the use of business bribes in e-commerce platforms that have contributed to
an explosion in online sales of counterfeit products. Part III explains that the
United States and IP owners still have the opportunity to address these
substantive issues by supplementing the USCTA’s IP sections with effective
anti-corruption provisions. Part III also proposes guidelines and suggestions for
the drafting of these provisions.
I. THE USCTA’S NEW APPROACH TO IP PROTECTION
The first chapter of the USCTA deals with a group of longstanding IP issues
that the United States has thrust to the top of its IP agenda with China. Chief
among these issues is trade secret protection, which has emerged as the most
urgent IP issue for MNCs in China.47 Other issues concern trademark
squatting,48 a patent term extension to compensate for delays in the approval

44 The USCTA creates direct obligations on China to enact domestic legislation. This obligation can be
inferred from the language of the treaty. For example, Article 1.3:2 provides “China shall define
‘operators’ in trade secret misappropriation to include all natural persons, groups of persons, and
legal persons.” USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.3:2. China has a duty to define “operators” as so
prescribed in its domestic legislation.
45 Id.
46 See Jessica Bursztynsky, Trump Trade Advisor Peter Navarro Lists What the US Wants from China
in
‘Phase
Two’
Trade
Deal,
CNBC
(Jan.
16,
2020,
8:14
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/16/peter-navarro-lists-usdemands-from-china-in-phase-two-tradedeal.html.
47 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets Protection in China, 47 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1007, 1008 (2014) [hereinafter Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets].
For trade secrets provisions, see USCTA, supra note 1, arts. 1.3–1.9.
48 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.24 (bad faith registration of trademarks). For a discussion of this issue,
see Daniel C.K. Chow, Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous Marks Doctrine China,
47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 57 (2015) [hereinafter Chow, Trademark Squatting].
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process,49 counterfeit medicines,50 and counterfeits sold on e-commerce
platforms.51 Although the United States has complained about these issues for
years, China has failed to make sufficient progress to appease the United States,
leading the Trump Administration to adopt a radical new approach under the
USCTA.
A. APPROACHES UNDER PREVIOUS U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS
Soon after China opened its economy to foreign investment from MNCs in
the 1980s, the United States began to complain about problems concerning IP
protection and enforcement.52 During this initial wave of foreign investment in
MNCs in China, most MNCs sought to establish a joint venture with a local
partner that could navigate the local legal and political environment.53 When
MNCs establish a joint venture in China, the business entity begins as an empty
vessel that must receive essential inputs in the form of capital and technology.54
For example, when Procter & Gamble (P&G) set up its first joint venture in 1988
in Guangzhou in Southern China,55 P&G also injected capital and transferred
technology in the form of patents, trademarks, and trade secrets to the joint
venture.56 The capital is used to purchase land-use rights, buildings, machinery,
and equipment.57 At this point, the joint venture would have all of the physical
structures and tools necessary to manufacture P&G’s products; however, the
joint venture still needed access to P&G’s technology. Without access to P&G’s
proprietary technology, the joint venture would lack the know-how to
manufacture the shampoo, laundry detergent, and toothpaste that the company
sought to produce and sell in China.58 In a pattern that would be repeated many
times, almost as soon as P&G’s joint venture began production, illegal
underground factories sprouted up nearby.59 These underground factories

49 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.12 (patent term extension). For a discussion of this issue, see Daniel
C.K. Chow, Three Major Problems Threatening Multi-National Pharmaceutical Companies Doing
Business in China, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 46 (2017).
50 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.18 (counterfeit medicines); see Chow, supra note 49.
51 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.13–1.4 (online infringement and counterfeits). For a discussion of this
issue, see Chow, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra note 38.
52 See RAMI M. OLWAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 71–
72 (2013); Bryan Mercurio, The Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property in China since
Accession to the WTO: Progress and Retreat, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, July 2012, at 23, 24.
53 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 499 (4th ed. 2020).
54 Id. at 503.
55 Procter & Gamble Announces Joint Venture with China, UPI (July 6, 1988),
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/07/06/Procter-Gamble-announces-joint-venture-withChina/2947584164800/.
56 The author was head of the legal department for P&G’s China operations and was involved firsthand
in drafting joint venture agreements and in enforcing the company’s intellectual property rights.
57 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 53, at 503.
58 Id.
59 Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multinational Companies in China: How a
Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 763 (2010) [hereinafter
Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies]. While serving as in-house counsel for a multinational
company based in China, the author determined that relatives or friends of employees at the MNC
would help set up an illegal factory and would obtain IP and business information from the
employees.
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flooded the market with counterfeits and knock-offs of P&G’s products.60
Problems of rampant counterfeiting and piracy arising from China’s opening to
foreign investment in the 1980s led the United States to begin a Section 301
investigation of China’s IP practices in April 1991.61
In 1992, the United States and China entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on the Protection of Intellectual Property to address and
resolve these IP disputes.62 The MOU established an approach that the United
States followed until the United States broke new ground with the USCTA in
2020. Although the terms are used imprecisely, under international law, an MOU
is considered to be an agreement that is less formal than a treaty, shorter in
length, and is sometimes considered to be a general framework under which
further agreements will be reached.63 As a reflection of the informal nature of
the MOU, in 1995 China responded to U.S. demands in the 1992 MOU in a letter
written to the USTR.64 After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 2001,65 the United States and China continued to work on an informal basis
to deal with IP and other trade issues. During the first two decades of the new
millennium, the United States worked on these issues through bilateral
dialogues, including the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT) and the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED), to attempt
to address some of the U.S. concerns.66 At times, the discussion on intellectual
property in the dialogues would result in an agreement, such as the 2011
Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in Chengdu, China.67 At other times,
China would make specific commitments on intellectual property at the end of
a round of discussions in the JCCT or the S&ED.68
The most serious flaw in this informal approach is that commitments under
the JCCT, the S&ED, MOUs, and other agreements lacked any dispute
resolution and enforcement procedure. As a result, the United States was left

60 XIAOWEN TIAN, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN CHINA 161 (2016).
61 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10708, ENFORCING U.S. TRADE LAWS: SECTION
301
AND
CHINA
(2018),
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1248239/m2/1/high_res_d/IF10708_2018Aug02.pd
f.
62 1992 MOU, supra note 9.
63 See generally Aaron Messing, Note, Nonbinding Subnational International Agreements: A
Landscape Defined, 30 GEO. ENV’T. L. REV. 173, 188–90 (2018).
64 People’s Republic of China Intellectual Property Rights Memorandum of Understanding—1995
Action
Plan
(Feb.
26,
1995),
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005363.asp. The Letter
contained an appendix containing a more detailed action plan to change to China’s IP laws. Id.
65 See
China
and
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm (last visited June 1, 2020) (“China
has been a member of the WTO since 11 December 2001.”).
66 OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., supra note 10; EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT ON BILATERAL
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HU OF CHINA, (2009); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, U.S.-CHINA
STRATEGIC ECONOMIC DIALOGUE (2009).
67 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CHINA (2011),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/11-1121.1-China-Trade-Inelllect-PropertyRights-Cooperation.pdf.
68 See OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, at tbl.I.1 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF
(“China’s
Bilateral
Commitments Relating to Technology Transfer, 2010–2016”).
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with no formal means of holding China to its commitments, which went largely
unfulfilled. This process led to years of U.S. frustration:
As is happening today, IP got injected into the trade process,
but the waltz was long and slow. The USTR would complain
of China’s failure to halt piracy of US-created goods; the two
countries would enter into a MOU [memorandum of
understanding] in which China would agree to clean up its act;
three years later the USTR would identify continuing
violations and come back and say, “this time we really mean
it;” and the two countries would enter into another, more
detailed MOU, and so on.69
The United States’ dissatisfaction with China as it danced around its
commitments was not limited to China’s IP practices but extended to China’s
other trade commitments. The United States believed that China was not
following through on its legal commitments under the WTO in many different
areas of trade in addition to intellectual property.70 With the ascension of Donald
J. Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2016, U.S. criticism of China took on a
decidedly more bellicose tone. In 2017, U.S. frustration with China reached a
boiling point, resulting in the following warning from the Trump
Administration:
For more than 15 years, the United States has relied on
cooperative high-level dialogues to effect meaningful and
fundamental changes in China’s state-led, mercantilist trade
regime. These efforts have largely failed. Accordingly, the
United States intends to focus its efforts on enforcement going
forward. The United States is determined to use every tool
available to address harmful Chinese policies and practices.71
The United States had announced that henceforth in its relationship with China,
it would forgo the carrot of negotiation in favor of brandishing the stick of
enforcement.
B. APPROACH UNDER THE USCTA
True to its word, the United States adopted an enforcement-based approach
to IP protections under the USCTA. The USCTA has the structure and formality
of a treaty, not the relaxed approach of an MOU, and offers a radical new
approach to dispute resolution and enforcement. The longstanding practice of
the United States under prior trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties
was to establish an independent and neutral arbitration tribunal that had the full

69 Sharon Driscoll, Intellectual Property and China: Is China Stealing American IP, SLS BLOGS: LEGAL
AGGREGATE (Apr. 10, 2018), https://law.stanford.edu/2018/04/10/intellectual-property-china-chinastealing-american-ip/ (interview with Professor Paul Goldstein).
70 OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2017 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 3 (2018),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/China%202017%20WTO%20Report.pdf.
71 Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
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power to rule against the United States.72 Under prior trade agreements,
whenever the dispute involved both a treaty and a WTO obligation, the
complainant could choose to bring the claim either with the treaty arbitration
tribunal or the WTO.73
Under USCTA, no dispute resolution tribunal is established.74 The two
nations are to resolve the dispute without the aid of a third party.75 If the parties
are unable to come to an agreement to resolve the dispute, the complaining party
has the right to impose trade sanctions.76 Although this right is available to either
party, in practice, the United States will be the complaining party as all of the
new obligations under the USCTA are imposed on China.77 In addition, the
complainant must bring all claims, including those involving WTO obligations
arising under the treaty, under the USCTA process.78
The dispute resolution mechanism under the USCTA must be understood in
the larger context of U.S. goals concerning the WTO dispute settlement system.
On December 10, 2019, only about one month before the parties entered into the
USCTA, the WTO dispute settlement system became crippled due to the actions
of the United States.79 Due to U.S. intransigence in refusing to approve new
members to the Appellate Body to replace retiring members, the number of panel
members fell below that necessary to convene a quorum.80 As a result, the
Appellate Body became paralyzed, and all decisions entered under the WTO
dispute settlement system became effectively unenforceable.81
The United States decommissioned the Appellate Body due to its
malfeasance in repeatedly ruling against the United States. According to the U.S.
view, the Appellate Body betrayed an understanding reached with the United
States that it would rule strictly in accordance with the text of the WTO

72 Chow, supra note 7 at 36.
73 Id.
74 See USCTA, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (“Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution”). The USCTA
requires the establishment of a Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution “Arrangement”
consisting of high-level trade officials from both parties. Id. at art. 7.2:1. No arbitration tribunal,
however, is to be established. Id.
75 Id. at art. 7.4.
76 Id. at art. 7.4:4.
77 A review of the USCTA reveals that all new obligations are imposed on China. At the end of many
of the articles in Chapter imposing substantive obligations relating to IP, the article states: “The
United States affirms that existing U.S. measures afford treatment equivalent to that provided for in
this Article.” See, e.g., USCTA, supra note 1, at art. 1.3:3.
78 There is no provision in USCTA Chapter 7, the dispute resolution chapter, for bring an action in the
WTO. See generally USCTA, supra note 1.
79 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 17.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Ken Roberts, World Trade’s Demise Scheduled for Dec. 10, FORBES
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenroberts/2019/11/27/world-trades-demisescheduled-for-dec-10/#a1d1d292412e; Adam Behsudi & Finbarr Bermingham, The End of World
Trade as We Know It, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/11/20/worldtrade-end-donald-trump072257.
80 Chow, supra note 7 at 38.
81 Daniel C.K. Chow, U.S. Trade Infallibility and the Crisis in the World Trade Organization, 2020
MICH. ST. L. REV. 599, 601, 610 (2020). A nation that violates any WTO agreement will be able to
freeze the WTO dispute settlement process in its tracks so that any adverse WTO decision against it
cannot be enforced. Once a WTO panel reaches a decision, the losing party can file an appeal to the
Appellate Body. The WTO cannot adopt the decision until the appeal is completed which has now
become impossible due to the paralysis of the Appellate Body. The decision is suspended indefinitely
in a legal limbo and so cannot be enforced against the losing party. Id.
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agreements;82 instead, the Appellate Body engaged in unauthorized and
illegitimate “judicial activism.”83 The USCTA offers a parallel dispute
resolution mechanism under which the United States can resolve both USCTA
and WTO claims against China.84 In an ominous development for the WTO, the
USCTA indicates that the United States does not intend to repair the flaws of the
WTO dispute settlement system, but to replace it with a process in new trade
agreements that is under complete U.S. control.85 The United States has
delivered a decisive two punch body blow to the WTO: the United States first
crippled the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and then created an alternative
forum to deal with IP disputes with China that it dominates and controls.
The USCTA also offers an unprecedented opportunity for the United States
to determine the content of China’s internal legislation. The USCTA creates
treaty obligations on China that it must implement through domestic
legislation.86 For example, Article 1.3:2 of the USCTA states, “China shall
define ‘operators’ in trade secret misappropriation to include all natural persons,
groups of persons, and legal persons.”87 Under the USCTA, China must enact or
amend its laws to give effect to this provision or else be subject to trade
sanctions.88 This treaty mechanism now allows the United States to directly
address the endemic problems of corruption by requiring detailed and specific
domestic legislation in China using textual language drafted by the United States
as guidelines, an opportunity that has never been available in the past.89
The result of the USCTA is that the United States has an uncontestable
unilateral right to determine that China is in violation of its treaty and WTO
obligations and to impose trade sanctions on China. Article 7.4:4(b) of the
USCTA details this procedure:
If the Parties do not reach consensus on a response, the
Complaining Party may resort to taking action based on facts
provided during the consultations, including by suspending an
obligation under this Agreement or by adopting a remedial
measure in a proportionate way that it considers appropriate
with the purpose of preventing the escalation of the situation
and maintaining the normal bilateral trade relationship. If the
Party Complained Against considers that the action by the
Complaining Party pursuant to this subparagraph was taken in
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 627.
Id. at 627–31.
Id. at 626–31.
Id. at 635-36.
Under U.S. jurisprudence, the USCTA is a non-self-executing treaty, i.e. a treaty that has no direct
effect within the legal system of the parties. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 53, at 35. The
parties must implement the treaty’s obligations through domestic legislation. Id. By contrast, a selfexecuting treaty has direct effect within the domestic legal order of the parties and needs no domestic
implementing legislation. Id. How does one determine whether the treaty is self-executing or nonself-executing? The most common approach is to examine the intent of the treaties as evidenced in
the treaty language. Id.
87 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.3:2.
88 This language that “China shall define ‘operators’” indicates that this is a non-self-executing treaty.
Id. The text of the treaty clearly contemplates that China will fulfill this obligation through a domestic
legal rule. If China fails to implement the obligation, then China is in breach of the USCTA.
89 A detailed search of past agreements with China has not revealed any mechanism similar to this
aspect of the USCTA in the past.
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good faith, the Party Complained Against may not adopt a
counter-response, or otherwise challenge such action. If the
Party Complained Against considers that the action of the
Complaining Party was taken in bad faith, the remedy is to
withdraw from this Agreement by providing written notice of
withdrawal to the Complaining Party.90
“Suspending an obligation” would include disregarding an agreed upon trade
concession, such as the WTO tariff rate for Chinese goods as set forth in the
United States’ tariff schedule.91 Once the obligation is disregarded or suspended,
the United States can raise the tariff above the WTO rate. A “remedial measure”
referred to above includes the imposition of trade sanctions, such as punitive
tariffs (i.e. tariffs in addition to the WTO tariff), a complete trade ban of all
goods, or a quota (i.e. a numerical restriction on import trade volumes).92 In
response, China would be prohibited from taking retaliatory measures so long
as the United States acted in good faith.93 China’s only option is to withdraw
from the USCTA.94
In the USCTA, the United States has now created an enforcement weapon
for its IP rights against China that is far more potent than any that had previously
existed. If the United States believes that China is in breach of any of the treaty’s
IP provisions or WTO obligations, the United States can act unilaterally to
impose trade sanctions on China. The USCTA forbids China from retaliating
and allows China only the option of withdrawing from the USCTA. If China
does withdraw, however, then the punitive tariffs that the United States
suspended as a result of the USCTA could be then be reinstated. China is now
trapped in a no-win situation in which punitive tariffs will be imposed no matter
what China chooses to do. China is also boxed into using the USCTA to resolve
its disputes as going through the WTO has now become futile.
II. THE NEED FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION PROVISIONS IN THE USCTA
While the drafters of the USCTA created a powerful enforcement
procedure, they overlooked major problems in the substantive provisions of the
USCTA. Consistent with the overall U.S. emphasis on enforcement, the
substantive provisions of the USCTA emphasize enforcement, with a particular
focus on criminal enforcement.95

90 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 7.4:4(b).
91 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES,
AND MATERIALS 88 (3d ed. 2017).
92 The variety of trade sanctions available to the United States in a putative trade emergency are set
forth in 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3) (A)–(C) (1994) (describing tariff increases and quantitative
restrictions).
93 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 7.4:4(b).
94 Id.
95 The USCTA has at least seven provisions that deal with criminal enforcement. See generally,
USCTA, supra note 1.
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A. FCPA ISSUES
The drafters of the USCTA’s criminal provisions left a significant gap in the
treaty by failing to deal with the pervasive and intractable problem of corruption
in the PRC criminal legal system that has burdened IP owners for years. For IP
owners, the most significant issue concerning corruption in China is not with
ramifications in the PRC legal system, but with the U.S. legal system; the major
protagonist in legal issues involving corruption is not the PRC government but
the U.S. government. Corruption in the PRC criminal enforcement system
implicates the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,96 which is enforced by two
U.S. government authorities: the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).97
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit a U.S. company, its
officers, and employees from making payments to a foreign official for the
purpose of obtaining or retaining business.98 This provision is routinely
implicated in the use of the PRC criminal enforcement system by IP brand
owners.
1. Payments to China’s Authorities in Trade Secrets Enforcement
a. The Public Security Bureaus
Under PRC law, the Public Security Bureau (PSB), China’s police, must
initiate any criminal case by beginning an investigation, including criminal trade
secrets and other IP cases.99 The PSB is charged with protecting PRC citizens
from crime and in maintaining public safety.100 The PSB’s first priority is on the
96 See generally, USCTA, supra note 1.
97 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, et seq. (1977). The USDOJ enforces the antibribery provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, –2, –3, and the SEC enforces the books and records
provision, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
98 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–2 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern . . . or for any officer, director, employee, or agent of
such domestic concerns or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such domestic concern, to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance
of an offer, payment, promise to pay, authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift,
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to . . . any foreign official . . . in
order to assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business . . .
In outline form, the statute, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1, –2, –3, prohibits:
(1) Issuers, domestic concerns, and any person
(2) from making the use of interstate commerce
(3) corruptly
(4) in furtherance of an offer or payment of anything of value
(5) to a foreign official
(6) for the purpose of influencing any act of that foreign official in violation of his or her duty in
order to obtain or retain business.
The FCPA can present particularly treacherous issues for MNCs in China. See Daniel C.K. Chow,
China Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2012).
99 Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gong’an Xingzheng Chufa Fa (中華人民共和國公安行政處罰法)
[Public Security Administrative Punishment Law of the People’s Republic of China] (adopted at the
17th meeting of the standing committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on Aug. 28, 2005,
effective Mar. 1, 2006) art. 77, translated at https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/publicsecurity-administration-punishment-law-chinese-text
[hereinafter
PRC
Public
Security
Administrative Punishment Law].
100 The Ministry of Public Security’s responsibilities are “[t]o prevent, stop, and investigate criminal
activities; [t]o fight against terrorist activities;” and “[t]o maintain stability and order[,]” among
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prevention and punishment of violent crimes, as these activities threaten public
safety and security.101 As a consequence, the PSB views economic crimes, such
as theft of trade secrets from wealthy MNCs or the sale of counterfeit products,
as a lower priority.102 As the PSB perceives its primary role to protect society
from violent crime, the PSB can be reluctant to pursue economic crimes where
the only “victim” is an MNC with deep pockets that has suffered a financial loss
that means lower profits.103 As a result, the PSB will usually ask an MNC for a
“case fee” in order to initiate a criminal case.104 The case fee is framed as an
administrative fee to cover the costs of the PSB’s investigation.105 For example,
a criminal investigation might involve travel and expenses such as hotel and
meals.106 As the PSB has a limited budget and its priority is on violent crime,
the PSB believes that wealthy MNCs should reimburse the PSB for the cost of
the investigation so that it will be able to have sufficient resources to discharge
its primary duty to protect society from violent crime.107
While the PRC has undertaken a well-publicized anti-corruption campaign
for the past several years, the targets of this campaign are political enemies of
Xi Jin Ping, China’s President and Chairman of the Communist Party.108 The
targeted persons derive personal financial gain by accepting bribes, which
allows Xi to remove them from office and punish them.109 A “case fee” made to
the PSB is not funneled to the private bank account of any PSB official. Instead,
it is made to the PSB’s coffers and used to defray its expenses in conducting the
investigation.110 As a result, the case fee is a type of payment that is not the target
of China’s current crackdown on corruption and is still routinely demanded.111
Not only is the case fee routinely demanded but it is also usually paid by the
MNC.112 This transaction now implicates the FCPA. The case fee is a payment
to a “foreign official,” and a quid pro quo is involved.113 In exchange for the
case fee, the PSB will initiate a criminal investigation.114

others. Ministry of Public Security, P.R.C. STATE COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2014)
http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/2014/09/09/content_281474986284154.htm.
101 PRC Public Security Administrative Punishment Law, supra note 99, art. 1.
102 Ministry of Public Security, supra note 100. The list of duties for the Ministry of Public Security do
not even list economic crimes, indicating their relatively low priority. Id.
103 This observation is based on the author’s own experience as in-house counsel for an MNC in China,
as a legal consultant and expert witness, and on recent conversations with lawyers working on IP
matters in the PRC.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Daniel C.K. Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms and the World Trade Organization,
41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 34–35 (2020) [hereinafter Chow, The Myth of China’s Open Market Reforms].
109 Id.
110 See supra note 103.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 The FCPA requires that the payment be made to a “foreign official.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1).
The quid pro quo is the exchange of money with the foreign official for a benefit given in return to
the MNC.
114 Case fees are not required by law. See generally PRC Public Security Administrative Punishment
Law, supra note 99. Thus, the MNC cannot use the defense under the FCPA that the payment was
lawful under the under the written laws of the PRC. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1) (affirmative defense
for payments “lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official’s . . . country”).
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The last element of an FCPA violation is that the payment must be made for
the purpose of “obtaining or retaining business.”115 This element is commonly
referred to as the business nexus test.116 Even if the payment is a bribe to a
foreign official, it is not an FCPA violation unless it is made for the purpose of
obtaining or retaining business.117 In United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit
rejected a narrow reading of the business purpose limited to obtaining or
renewing government contracts.118 In that case, executives of American Rice
Inc., a Houston-based corporation, paid bribes to Haitian officials to understate
the value of America Rice’s imported rice to Haiti.119 By having its imports
undervalued, American Rice paid significantly lower customs duties and sales
taxes on the imports to Haiti customs authorities.120 While American Rice
admitted that it made such payments, it argued that the payments did not violate
the FCPA as they were made for the purpose of lowering costs, not to retain or
obtain business.121 The district court agreed with American Rice and dismissed
the indictment against it.122
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the facts of the case could,
but not necessarily, support an indictment.123 The Fifth Circuit found that paying
a bribe to foreign officials to lower taxes lawfully owed allows the company to
reduce operating costs, freeing up capital that can be used to benefit the company
in its business and to create advantages over competitors.124 For example, due to
cost savings from lower taxes, the company could make a lower bid for a
government contract to the detriment of its competitors.125
A case fee given to the PSB could be viewed as having a business nexus
under the expanded and flexible approach of the Fifth Circuit. By paying the fee
to the PSB, the IP owner is able to induce the PSB to bring a criminal
investigation against the suspected infringer or counterfeiter. In China,
counterfeiters are interested in profits but are also extremely risk adverse and
sensitive to brand protection efforts.126 They seek to obtain the greatest profit
but at the lowest risk of capture and punishment.127 Once it becomes known
among counterfeiters that a company is willing to aggressively pursue pirates
through the use of the PSB, counterfeiters will migrate away from that
company’s products to a different product that is not as aggressively defended.128
For example, suppose that two MNCs, A and B, make successful and
competitive brands of shampoo at the high end of the market that are
counterfeited in large quantities. If Company A aggressively uses the PSB to
pursue counterfeiters but B does not (or has not begun to do so), these criminals

115 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).
116 See generally Tiffany Lu, The Obtaining or Retaining Business Requirement: Breathing New Life
into the Business Nexus Provision of the FCPA, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 729 (2013).
117 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)–(b).
118 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
119 Id. at 740–41.
120 Id. at 741.
121 Id. at 749.
122 Id. at 740.
123 Id. at 759–60.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 See supra note 103.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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will avoid counterfeiting A’s brand and begin to counterfeit B’s brands instead.
Company A “retains” business by avoiding losses due to counterfeiting and also
benefits by harming its competitors by shifting counterfeiting from its brands to
those of its competitors. The USDOJ might consider these facts to satisfy the
“business nexus” test as expounded by United States v. Kay.
An even more problematic issue arises with respect to the practice of some
PSBs in asking for a “reward” for each capture and arrest of a counterfeiter or
infringer.129 As an arrest and detention by the PSB creates great fear in
counterfeiters, MNCs always press the PSB for arrests.130 When faced with these
pressures, the PSB will sometimes ask for a “reward,” i.e. a payment of several
thousand dollars for each arrest.131 The PSB’s justification is that capturing and
arresting a counterfeiter intent on evading capture is an intensive activity with
higher costs that must be reimbursed.132 Under the FCPA, these payments might
also be considered to be an illegal quid pro quo and might also satisfy the
business nexus test as explained above.
b. Private Investigation Companies
Many MNCs in China hire private investigation companies to assist in the
protection of their IP rights.133 Not only do these companies have experience in
hunting suspects, but in some types of IP cases, such as counterfeiting, there are
risks to the personal safety of the MNC’s employees.134 For these reasons, MNC
will outsource this job to persons who are trained to do this dangerous work.135
Private investigation companies are not strictly regulated by the PRC and thus
can attract some nefarious characters who might be little different from the petty
criminals that they pursue.136 In some cases, the private investigation company
will pay the case fee to the PSB or other enforcement authorities.137 In addition,
the private investigation company will usually not inform the MNC that
payments have been made, but will submit an expense report to the MNC that
disguises the payments as other innocuous expenses.138
Using private investigation companies that pay case fees to PRC authorities
will not immunize MNCs from liability under the FCPA. Section 78dd–1(a)(3)
prohibits a U.S. company from making a payment to “any person, while
knowing that all or a portion of such money . . . will be . . . given . . . to any
foreign official.”139 The definition of “knowing” includes awareness that a
“result is substantially certain to occur.”140 The use of case fees is well-known
in the IP protection industry in China, and it is also widely known that some
private investigation companies engage in blatantly illegal conduct outside the
129 The author has personal knowledge of this practice, as he was present in a meeting with a PSB when
this request was made.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 59, at 763–64.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets, supra note 47, at 1035.
138 Id. at 1037.
139 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(a)(3) (2021).
140 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1(f)(2)(A)(i) (2021).
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purview of MNCs. Employees with the MNC that work with private
investigation companies are likely to have knowledge of these practices. In
addition, if the private investigation company is deemed to be an “agent” of the
MNC, then the proscription of §§ 78dd–1(a) and –2(a) apply as the issuer or
domestic concern is directly liable for actions committed by its agents.141 Under
these circumstances, funneling payments through the conduit of private
investigation companies would not immunize MNCs from prosecution under the
FCPA.
c. Accurate Record Keeping
In addition to its anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA also contains a
books and records provision that applies only to issuers of securities under the
Securities and Exchange Act.142 As many U.S. multinationals have stock that is
traded on public stock exchanges in the United States, many MNCs are subject
to the books and records provision. These provisions provide, in relevant part,
that every issuer “shall make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the issuer.”143 The purpose of this provision is to prevent
companies from hiding illegal payments by mischaracterizing them or by
omitting them altogether in their reports to their shareholders.144
Under this provision, any MNC with stock publicly traded in the United
States is required to disclose payments of case fees to its shareholders.
Independently of whether MNCs have violated the anti-bribery provisions of the
FCPA, MNCs that are issuers may also be in violation of the books and records
provisions if they fail to record and accurately disclose payment of case fees and
other payments (as further discussed below) to PRC officials. Failure to satisfy
the books and records provisions could trigger an investigation by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission and lead to civil liability.
d. Judicial Appraisal Authorities
i. Criminal Cases
Enforcement of trade secrets in China involves special problems
concerning the use of judicial appraisal authorities, which are state-owned
entities that have the expertise to deal with the sometimes arcane scientific and
technical issues involved in trade secrets.145
In many criminal trade secrets cases, judicial appraisal authorities play an
important role. Unlike in the case of counterfeit goods, it is not apparent to PRC
authorities, such as the PSB, when a violation has occurred in the case of a trade
secret. For example, if an MNC seeks to file a criminal counterfeiting case with
141 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd–1(a), –2(a) (2021).
142 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)(2) (2021).
143 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2021).
144 See Kay, 359 F.3d at 758.
145 See Decision of the National Standing Committee on the Administration of Issues Concerning
Judicial Administration, arts. I & II (adopted at the 14th Session of the Standing Committee of the
10th National People's Congress on Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006). Entities engaged in judicial
appraisal must be approved and registered by PRC authorities. See id. art. VI.
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the PSB, the MNC will need to make a preliminary showing that a crime has
occurred. All the MNC must do is display a copy of the trademark registration
certificate issued by PRC authorities proving that it is the owner of the
trademark.146 Then the MNC can display a sample of a counterfeit product using
its trademark and submit a statement that it did not authorize the manufacture of
the counterfeit. These two simple steps alone—that the MNC is the trademark
owner and it did not authorize the counterfeit—will satisfy PRC authorities that
an IP violation has occurred. In the case of trade secrets, however, making such
a preliminary showing is far more complex. For example, suppose that an MNC
approaches the PSB and claims that an enzyme formula used in making laundry
detergent and protected as a trade secret has been stolen and is now being used
by a competitor. Among other requirements, the MNC will need to show that
the enzyme formula used in the competitor’s product is a copy of the enzyme
formula used in the MNC’s own detergent.147 Even if the MNC has chemical
studies purporting to show this result, the PSB is not qualified to review such a
study. The PSB are enforcement officials who lack any formal training in
intellectual property and the scientific knowledge necessary to read and
understand any such offer of proof. Many other trade secrets could involve
scientific, mathematical, and engineering concepts that are not accessible to
ordinary law enforcement officials or to any persons not trained in these fields.
Like other PRC authorities, the PSB has no interest in bringing a trade
secrets criminal case that lacks a legal foundation and exposing itself to claims
of exceeding its authority or abuse of power. In cases involving trade secrets,
the PSB will often refer the matter to a judicial appraisal authority that has the
expertise to conduct a scientific analysis and to conclude whether a trade secret
has been copied.148 Once a judicial appraisal authority issues a report that the
suspect has copied the MNC’s trade secret, the PSB can proceed with the
investigation to determine whether a theft of the trade secret has occurred.149
The PSB is now protected by the official report and cannot be charged with the
unlawful exercise of its authority.150
The problem lies in the judicial appraisal authority’s demand for a fee for
its services. Like most state entities in China that perform a service, the judicial
appraisal authority expects to be paid a fee.151 As the PSB has referred the matter
to the authority to continue its investigation, the PSB should pay the fee, but the
PSB will usually demand that the MNC pay the fee instead.152 Having already
paid the PSB a case fee, the MNC is now expected to also pay the judicial
appraisal authority for its analysis and report, a fee that should be paid by the
PSB. In other cases, the MNC will first approach the judicial appraisal authority
on its own, knowing that it will need to submit a report to the PSB before the

146 This observation is based on the author’s own experience working with the PSB.
147 See Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 10.
148 See generally Brian J. Safran, A Critical Look at Western Perceptions of China's Intellectual Property
System, 3 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 135 (2012).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Yi Xue, Trade Secrets 2020: China, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://practiceguides.chambers.com/practice-guides/trade-secrets-2020/china (referring to fees to be
paid to judicial appraisal authority).
152 Chow, Navigating the Minefield of Trade Secrets, supra note 47, at 1037.
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PSB will take any action. To obtain the report, the MNC will also need to pay a
fee to the judicial appraisal authority.153
In these scenarios, the MNC could once again be viewed as “paying” for
enforcement services. This scenario also takes on the appearance of the MNC
paying for an official report that makes a finding in its favor. The outcome of
the report by the judicial appraisal authority is critical to the criminal
investigation because if the report finds that the trade secret has not been copied,
then the PSB will terminate the investigation. In other words, the MNC is paying
for the report but has a strong interest in a positive result. Once again, the MNC
finds itself in a compromised position and one that might implicate the FCPA.
If the MNC pays the fee to the judicial authority, it is paying for a report that has
official legal authority and that may result in a ruling in its favor. The USDOJ
might consider this payment to be an illegal payment under the FCPA’s antibribery provisions.
An even more unfortunate situation arises when the PSB or the judicial
appraisal authority demands additional fees after the initial fees have been
paid.154 The judicial appraisal authority might inform the MNC that it needs
additional payments in order to complete the report.155 The judicial appraisal
authority might claim that the analysis is more complex than anticipated and that
more time and resources must be expended to complete the report.156 The PSB
might make similar demands.157 The MNC is now under strong pressure to
comply and begins to feel trapped and exploited by a series of never ending
demands for payment.
ii. Civil Cases
So far this discussion has focused on the use of judicial appraisal authorities
in criminal cases, but a civil proceeding involving trade secrets might also
require the use of such authorities. Under the new burden-shifting rules of the
USCTA in trade secrets cases, the plaintiff has the initial burden of making a
prima facie showing that a trade secret has been stolen, at which point the burden
shifts to the defendant to show that it did not steal the trade secret.158 Although
the plaintiff might be able to show a prima facie case to the satisfaction of the
court without the use of a report from a judicial appraisal authority, that might
not be possible in cases involving complex claims and technical issues. The
plaintiff might need to obtain a report from a judicial appraisal authority to
satisfy its initial burden before the court. These types of civil cases could also
involve payments by the plaintiff to the judicial appraisal authority for a report
as part of its prima facie case. Once again, the payment might implicate issues
under the FCPA.
This discussion has been merely illustrative of the problems involving
demands for payments by PRC authorities that plague MNCs. This Article has
focused on the most sensitive and problematic demands, but demands can also

153 See Xue, supra note 151.
154 This observation is based on the author’s own experience working as an in-house counsel in China.
155 Xue, supra note 151.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 USCTA, supra note 1, at art. 1.5(2)(a).
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arise in many other contexts. For example, if administrative authorities seize
counterfeit goods, the authorities may decide to store them in a warehouse and
then later destroy them.159 The authorities might ask the MNC to reimburse the
costs of storage and destruction of the goods.160 There appears to be a pervasive
attitude among PRC authorities that MNCs have abundant financial resources
and that they should therefore be expected to assume some of the costs of
investigations and enforcement actions by PRC enforcement authorities, which
have limited resources and different priorities.161 This is a pervasive and
longstanding problem and can be manifested in many different contexts other
than those used as illustrations in this section.
B. THE PROBLEM OF EX PARTE CONTACTS IN CHINA’S CIVIL LITIGATION
SYSTEM
In addition to an emphasis on criminal enforcement, the USCTA also
contains many provisions intended to strengthen civil enforcement through
court-based IP litigation. In the area of civil litigation, MNCs in China have been
plagued for years by the common practice of defendants exploiting systemic
weaknesses in the PRC legal system by using ex parte contacts to attempt to
influence the outcome of civil cases.162 This type of practice is not limited to IP
cases, but applies in general to civil litigation. But as the USCTA was enacted
to enhance enforcement through civil litigation—in addition to criminal
enforcement—of IP cases, it is important to spell out these problems, as MNC
plaintiffs are highly likely to encounter these problems in civil litigation over IP
disputes. The discussion of the problems will also be helpful in a subsequent
section of this article that will discuss remedial measures.
Civil litigation in China is well-known to be plagued by problems of
corruption. In 2016, Professor Jerome Cohen referred to it as a “looming crisis”
and explained:
Today there is a huge amount of popular dissatisfaction with
the judicial system [in China]. . . . People realize the local
courts are full of corruption. . . . Guanxi—the influence of
relatives, friends, and contacts—is the biggest problem. Whom
did judges go to high school with? Who is their cousin? Who
is a friend of a friend? These questions permeate the system
and often undermine fair adjudication. And, of course, political
interference is pronounced. Local government or party
officials, or members of the local people’s congress, use their
low-visibility powers to adversely affect what might otherwise
be independent, fair judgments.163

159 This observation is based on the author’s own experience with administrative authorities in enforcing
IP rights in China. The author has also discussed these issues with lawyers currently practicing IP
law in China.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See HE & NG, supra note 31, at 843.
163 Cohen, supra note 29.
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In a typical case of most relevance to the present discussion, the party using
guanxi is a defendant in a case brought by an MNC.164 The defendant or its
lawyers will not approach the front line judge directly but will approach a
professional colleague of the judge and one who holds a higher ranked
supervisory position;165 in other cases, the defendant might approach a senior
government or Party official.166 The higher level supervisor or official then
approaches the frontline judge involved in the litigation and attempts to
influence the outcome of the litigation. The defendant might also approach a
relative or friend of the frontline judge.
Although Cohen refers to using ex parte contacts to influence a judge as
corruption, PRC law is unclear on whether using guanxi is illegal. In cases
involving the use of guanxi by skillful practitioners, no money usually changes
hands. Instead, appealing to a sense of professional obligation or a desire to help
a relative or friend on the part of a judge is the motivation for favoring the
connected party. Some type of return favor to be given to the front-line judge is
expected in the future. Under current PRC law, the use of guanxi where no
money or property changes hands appears to fall within a gap or a gray area.
Under China’s bribery laws, influencing a judge through guanxi, even when
there is a quid pro quo involving favors, is not considered bribery so long as no
money or property changes hands. PRC Criminal Law provides:
Article 389: Whoever, for the purpose of securing illegitimate
benefits, gives money or property to a State functionary shall
be guilty of offering bribes.167
Article 385: Any State functionary who, by taking advantage
of his position, extorts money or property from another person,
or illegally accepts another person’s money or property in
return for securing benefits for the person shall be guilty of
acceptance of bribes.168
These articles make clear that the giving or accepting of “money or
property” is an essential element of the crimes of giving or accepting a bribe.
Using non-monetary means to influence a judge or accepting a non-monetary
benefit does not fall within the definition of bribery. In addition, there does not
appear to be any other provision of law in China that explicitly deals with the
use of guanxi.169 To the contrary, guanxi is deeply embedded in traditional
Chinese culture that long predates the current regime of the Communist Party.170
The existence of, and tacit acceptance or tolerance of, guanxi in China is one

164 See HE & NG, supra note 31, at 863.
165 See id. at 862.
166 See id. at 846.
167 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中華人民共和國刑法) [Criminal Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (adopted by the Second Meeting of the Fifth Session of the National People’s
Congress, July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980), art. 389, translated at
https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china
(emphasis added).
168 Id. at art. 385 (emphasis added).
169 The author conducted a review of China’s criminal, civil, and administrative laws.
170 See DUNNING & KIM, supra note 35, at 329–30.
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reason why it is so pervasive, hard to eradicate, and creates a significant systemic
weakness in the PRC judicial system that defendants often exploit.
A recent study found that attempting to influence judges through guanxi is
a common practice in the PRC. The study showed that 52% of PRC judges said
that in handling cases they were approached by guanxi and that 61% of judges
mentioned that within the scope of discretion, they favored the connected
parties.171 Under the right set of circumstances, the use of guanxi can be very
powerful and effective in influencing a frontline judge:
The Chinese court is a hierarchical institution. A judge’s
income and promotions . . . are to a large extent determined by
her supervisors. A judge is under strong pressure to deliver if
she is approached by someone who is in a supervisory position;
in other words, that person has direct control over her in the
bureaucracy. . . . The term “supervisor” goes beyond the
immediate boss of the judge; it includes any officials within the
judicial system who are in a position to assess the performance
of the judge and thus affect her welfare and career prospects.
Supervisors thus include division directors or presidents of the
court. Supervisors can also include senior judges from the
corresponding appellate court. These senior judges determine
if a lower-court judge’s decision is reversed or remanded,
either of which is a strike against her performance record. . . .
Local administrative leaders and Party officials are responsible
for the appointment and removal of court officials. Local
officials in charge of powerful bureaus in the economic sector
. . . also play “supervisory” roles as they have de facto control
over the court budget and staffing decisions.172
The number of persons who can affect the judge’s decision can be quite
large so skillful influence peddlers in China can have a high success rate in
influencing the outcome of litigation. In practice, many PRC law firms boast of
their professional ties with government officials and will hire former judges in
order to attract clients.173 The use of ex parte contacts and influence peddling
and the longstanding tolerance of such practices in China is a serious systemic
weakness of the legal system that is left unaddressed in the current text of the
USCTA.
C. BRIBES AND THE ONLINE SALES OF COUNTERFEITS
The USCTA recognizes that online sales of counterfeits worldwide
through e-commerce sites have exploded and created a major problem for IP
owners.174 Article 1.13 of the USCTA deals specifically with the requirement
for e-commerce sites to have expeditious and effective notice and take-down

171 HE & NG, supra note 31, at 842.
172 Id. at 846 (emphasis added).
173 Id.
174 CHOW, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra note 38, at 160.
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procedures for postings or webpages that sell counterfeit goods.175 Article 1.13
is undoubtedly based upon frequent complaints from IP owners that e-commerce
sites such as Alibaba and Amazon require IP owners to use convoluted and
labyrinthine notice and take-down procedures that only add to their misery and
frustration.176 IP owners have described these procedures as “Kafka-esque”177
and their use as being imprisoned in “Amazon purgatory.”178
No prophylactic or enforcement measure in the USCTA, however,
addresses the common problem of online operators who give business bribes to
employees at e-commerce sites in China. Online operators in China pay bribes
to receive preferential business opportunities that squeeze out competitors.179
For example, in exchange for bribes, online operators are allowed to delete
negative comments and post fictitious ones.180 Online counterfeiters also give
bribes to employees who will then tip off the counterfeiters of investigations
launched by PRC enforcement authorities.181 The common use of business
bribes given to employees of e-commerce sites by unscrupulous online operators
can undermine the implementation in practice of any of the new provisions of
the USCTA.
The most damaging consequence caused by business bribes is the lax
implementation of registration and verification requirements for online
operators by e-commerce sites.182 One of the most intractable problems is the
use of false names and identities by online counterfeiters.183 When IP owners
attempt to take down a site or listing selling counterfeit goods, they find that
registered names and addresses are fictitious and that online counterfeiters
quickly vanish into cyberspace.184
Due to China’s national policies that require extensive supervision of all
aspects of Chinese society, China, ironically, provides the tools that would allow
IP owners to identify and locate counterfeiters. For example, Article 23 of State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) Order No. 60, Measures on
the Administration of Online Transactions (MAOT):
The business operator of a third-party transaction platform
shall examine and register as business operators the identities
of the legal persons, other economic organizations or industrial
and commercial sole proprietors that apply for access to the
said platform for sale of products or provision of services,
establish registration files and conduct regular verification and
updating, and make public the information specified in their
business licenses or provide electronic links to their business

175 USCTA, supra note 1, art. 1.13.
176 CHOW, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra note 38, at 186–87.
177 Id. at 186–87.
178 Id.
179 CHOW, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra note 38, at 181.
180 Id. at 182.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 193.
183 Id. at 186.
184 Id.
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licenses in eye-catching locations on its main web pages for
business activities.185
The business license referred to in this regulation is issued to every lawful
business by PRC Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC).186 Every
lawful business must apply to the local administrative authorities for a business
license and no business entity can lawfully operate without one.187 The AICs
will review the application and verify its information before issuing the official
license and registering the company as a lawful business.188 The business license
identifies the correct name and location of the business operator and also
includes the name of the business entity’s legal representative.189 Under PRC
Company Law, the legal representative is a natural person who is subject to
criminal and civil liability for the malfeasance of the company.190 PRC
authorities wanted to ensure that a natural person could be held liable for
wrongful acts of the company and that liability could not ultimately rest with the
legal entity.191 By identifying the legal representative, the business license gives
IP owners a natural person against whom they can bring a criminal or civil legal
action in China independent of the remedy available by using the e-commerce
site’s notice and takedown procedures.
Each business license contains a unique eighteen-digit number known as the
“unified social credit code”192 that is the business entity’s official business
registration number.193 The number can also be used to search a publicly
available national database to find the business license and registration
information online, including the name of the registering entity, the entity type,
and the region of registration.194
If e-commerce sites accurately registered online operators, the information
on the business license, such as the name and address of the business entity, the
name of the legal representative, and the company’s unified social credit number
will be available to the public as required by PRC law.195 Most counterfeiters
hide behind false names and addresses for fear of identification and capture; if
e-commerce sites rigorously verified identities by requiring the display of

185 Administrative Measures for Online Transactions (promulgated by the State Admin. of Indus. &
Com., Order No. 60, Jan. 26, 2014, effective Mar. 15, 2014), art 23.
186 Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the President of the PRC, Order
No. 42, Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), ch. I, art. 7.
187 Id.
188 See Matt Slater, What is a China AIC?, CHINA CHECKUP (Dec. 9, 2013),
https://www.chinachekcup.com/blogs/articles/china-aic (“China AICs . . . provide official
registration records for all companies in their jurisdiction . . . .”).
189 Companies Law of the PRC, supra note 186, at ch. I, art. 7.
190 Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze (中華人民共和國民法通則) [General Principles of
Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China] (adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National
People’s Congress, Apr. 12, 1986, promulgated by Order No. 37 of the President of the People’s
Republic
of
China,
Apr.
12,
1986)
art.
49,
translated
at
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn012en.pdf.
191 Id. ch. III, arts. 38, 49.
192 Maarten Beekers, How to Verify a China Business License in 5 Steps, CHINA TRADE BLOG (Jan. 11,
2019), https://chinatradeblog.org/china-business-license-verification/.
193 Maarten Beekers, China Business License, CHINA TRADE BLOG (Jan. 5, 2019),
https://chinatradeblog.org/china-business-license-in-english/.
194 BEEKERS, supra note 192.
195 Administrative Measures for Online Trading, supra note 185, at art. 23.
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business licenses on their webpages, many counterfeiters would be deterred
from using e-commerce platforms to sell their illegal goods.196 Even if the ecommerce sites only asked for the business entity’s 18 digit unified social credit
code that alone would be a powerful deterrent. A review of recent webpages of
sites selling counterfeit products indicates, however, that no business license is
displayed and no electronic links to the business license are made available in
direct contravention of Article 23 of MOAT set forth above.197
At present, major e-commerce sites such as Alibaba are notoriously lax
about and merely “pay lip service”198 to registration and verification
requirements. Online counterfeiters pay business bribes to employees at ecommerce sites to relax their standards, to ignore the requirements of business
licenses, and to allow the counterfeiters to assume false identities and fictitious
addresses.199 Without the ability to identify and deter counterfeiters, the
effectiveness of the USCTA’s provisions enhancing the ease of notice and
takedown procedures is undermined. Even if an IP is able to expeditiously take
down an illegal site, the counterfeiter will in short order assume a new false
name and address and repost the same listing. The simple act of prohibiting
business bribes and requiring e-commerce sites to rigorously enforce existing
PRC laws on entity registration and verification should have an immediate and
significant effect in reducing online sales of counterfeit goods.
III. CONCLUSION
As a matter of procedural law, the United States created the ultimate
enforcement weapon in the USCTA. The United States designed the dispute
resolution mechanism to box China into a no-win situation. Once the United
States finds China in breach, China will have to suffer tariffs under the USCTA
or if China withdraws from the USCTA, China will suffer the reinstated tariffs
that the USCTA suspended. As a matter of procedure, the USCTA is innovative
and path breaking; it is also clever and ruthless.
By contrast, the USCTA’s substantive provisions have fallen short. They
have failed to address the pervasive and systemic problem of corruption that
creates barriers to on the ground enforcement in China. As this discussion has
indicated, problems of government and business corruption occur in many
different areas of the legal and administration systems and business sectors
related to the protection of intellectual property. 200 The discussion in this article

196 CHOW, Counterfeiting in the Age of the Internet, supra note 38, at 192.
197 See id. at Appendixes 1-3.
198 Id. at 193.
199 Id. at 181–82.
200 Moreover, other problems of corruption that are indirectly related to IP protection, such as bribery in
the pharmaceutical and health care industry, create additional major problems for MNCs but have
not addressed in this article as these issues are outside of its scope. For MNCs in the pharmaceutical
industry, a major problem is the common practice of doctors requiring “kickbacks,” i.e. payments
from pharmaceutical companies for prescribing their medications to patients in China’s state-owned
hospitals. This practice is common because doctors in the public health sector in the PRC receive
modest salaries and supplement their incomes by receiving these payments. The practice is tolerated
by the PRC government as a subsidy by pharmaceutical companies to support underpaid doctors. The
payment by the MNC pharmaceutical company can be considered quid pro quo or a bribe and a doctor
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has focused on some of the most serious and common problems, but corruption
is capable of many variations and can occur in many different contexts. The
common theme to all of these forms of corruption is the abuse of the PRC legal
and administrative apparatus to obtain benefits through the use of money,
property, or influence. These problems can create barriers to effective on the
ground enforcement by MNCS in China that negatively impact the conduct of
their day-to-day business operations. Moreover, they can expose MNCs to
significant risks—not from the PRC government—but from the United States
government under the FCPA.
Fortunately, there is still an opportunity for the United States to address
problems of corruption in IP protection. The United States and China are now in
the process of negotiating Phase II of the USCTA.201 This negotiation will allow
the United States to amend the IP provisions of Phase I or to add new provisions
to Phase II of the USCTA. There will also likely be future trade negotiations
where these issues can be addressed through new provisions. In drafting these
new provisions, the United States should be guided by the following
considerations.
To address the demand for payments and issues related to the FCPA, the
United States should insist on a provision that prohibits the demand by PRC
authorities of all fees in exchange for the performance of their duties.202 This
prohibition would include fees that represent reimbursement of costs or expenses
used in the performance of their duties, whether these fees are styled as case
fees, fees for tests, technical services, or as miscellaneous expenses.203 These
new provisions are necessary due to an entrenched attitude on the part of PRC
authorities that MNCs that have deep financial resources and can be expected to
contribute to the performance of public services by PRC governmental entities
that have limited resources. A more sinister attitude that may also exist in the
PRC is that MNCs with deep pockets can be easily manipulated and exploited.
Aside from protecting MNCs from liability under the FCPA, such a provision
will also help relieve MNCs from the misery of being exploited by PRC
authorities.
The United States should clamp down on the use of influence peddling
(guanxi) by inserting a clause that prohibits the parties from directly or indirectly
engaging in ex parte contacts with judges in legal proceedings.204 The United
States should also insist that China define the crime of bribery to include the
exchange of non-tangible benefits to influence the result of a legal or
administrative proceeding.205 At present, China’s criminal laws only include the
at a state-owned hospital could be considered to be a “foreign official” under the FCPA. See CHOW,
supra note 49, at 63.
201 See Bursztynsky, supra note 46.
202 For example, “China shall prohibit its government entities, including the Public Security Bureau, the
Administrations of Industry and Commerce, and judicial appraisal authorities, from demanding the
payment of fees as a condition of performing their duties, whether called case fees, administrative
fees, reimbursement fees, or fees for tests, reports, or analysis.”
203 See supra text accompanying note 202.
204 For example, “China shall prohibit parties in a litigation or their representatives from having ex parte
contacts with the judge directly or indirectly through the use of intermediaries, including other judges,
government or Party officials, colleagues, associates, friends, or relatives.”
205 For example, PRC Criminal Law Article 385 could be amended as follows “Whoever, for the purpose
of securing illegitimate benefits, gives money or property or anything of value to a State functionary
shall be guilty of offering bribes.”
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exchange of “money” or “property” in the crime of bribery, leaving wide open
the opportunity to use ex parte contacts (i.e. using guanxi) to influence the results
of legal proceedings without the use of money or property. The addition of a
term also prohibiting the giving of “anything of value” should close this loophole
in China’s anti-bribery law.206 The use of guanxi has an extensive history, long
predating the PRC, which is endemic to China’s entire legal, administrative, and
political system.207 It is also common in social relationships.208 A clear directive
is required to prohibit its use in criminal or business litigation.
The United States should also amend the USCTA provisions dealing with
online sales of counterfeits by adding a specific provision that requires China to
amend its criminal laws to prohibit online operators from giving and ecommerce sites from accepting business bribes.209 A provision specifically
limited to bribes in e-commerce is necessary to deter these practices.210 The
United States should also include a provision that specifically requires ecommerce sites to rigorously enforce China’s registration and verification
procedures for online operators so that their true identities and locations become
publicly available.211 These actions should have an immediate and positive
effect in deterring online sales of counterfeit products.
The current relationship between the United States and China is fraught with
many issues and some fundamental concerns, such as the United States’ mistrust
of China’s Communist Party,212 and are far too complex to discuss in this article.
This article has focused mainly on the problems of IP protections raised in the
USCTA that mainly affect U.S. multinational companies doing business in
China. As a matter of procedural law, the USCTA has created the ultimate
enforcement weapon that is under the complete control of the United States and
that has boxed China into a no-win situation. With regard to substantive issues,
however, the longstanding problem of government and business corruption
creates barriers to effective on the ground enforcement of IP rights in China. At
present, the United States has a rare opportunity through the continuing
negotiations of Phase II of the USCTA to address some pervasive and intractable
substantive legal issues that have long plagued MNCs in protecting their
intellectual property rights in China.

206 See supra text accompanying note 205.
207 See Gold et al., supra note 35; see also Dunning & Kim, supra note 35.
208 This observation is based on the author’s own experiences living and working in China.
209 For example, “China shall ensure that its criminal laws prohibit all e-commerce platforms, their
officers, employees, or agents from demanding or accepting any money, property, or anything of
value from online operators during the registration process or thereafter. China shall also ensure that
its criminal laws prohibit online operators from offering any money, property, or anything of value
to officers, employees, or agents of e-commerce platforms.”
210 See supra text accompanying note 209.
211 For example, “China shall ensure that e-commerce platforms rigorously enforce Article 23 of SAIC
Order No. 60 and other laws, regulations, or notices regarding registration procedures by requiring
that all online operators display their business licenses, the name of the legal representative, and their
eighteen-digit unified social credit code on their webpages or websites.”
212 White House Report Criticizes China’s Economic Policies, Human Rights Violations, CNBC:
POLITICS (May 21, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/21/white-house-report-criticizes-chinapolicies.html.

